



## **Being-in-the-World: Variations on Heideggerian, Wittgensteinian, and Confucianist Themes**

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- ¶1. In this paper, I propose to discuss a sense of being-in-the-world in Heidegger and proceed to locate themes in Wittgenstein and Confucianism which resonate with Heidegger's theme(s).
  
- ¶2. Heidegger's sense of being-in-the-world has twofold significance: critical and constructive. In his critical frame of mind, Heidegger raises polemics against the "Cartesian model".[\[1\]](#) which generates the problem of the external world and the related problem of other minds. The constructive aspect of being-in-the-world captures the sense of what it means to be fully human. Heidegger affirms the primacy of the manifest image over the scientific image.[\[2\]](#)

- ¶3. For Heidegger, transcendence means being always already in the world and being with others. Dasein is ineluctably situated and intersubjective. Dasein is being-in-the-world and being with others. Heidegger says that "being-in-the-world is the basic constitution of Dasein."[\[3\]](#) "Transcendence is being-in-the-world."[\[4\]](#) "The statement about transcendence is an existential (ontological) assertion, and not an existentiell (ontic) assertion."[\[5\]](#) "Being-with . . . is co-original with being-in-the-world."[\[6\]](#) Dasein is neither a worldless subject nor an otherless subject. Dasein is not an object (substance) in the world, nor is it a worldless subject which needs to reach out for the world and other fellow beings in a Cartesian manner. And "there can be no question of an isolation of the I, and therefore no talk of 'I am alone in the world'."[\[7\]](#)
- ¶4. "Just as Dasein is far from being first only a worldless subject and an 'interior' to which the world is added, so is it far from becoming being-with because an other turns up in fact. This co-Dasein of others right in everydayness is characteristic of in-being as absorption in the world under concern . . . in which everyone dwells. . . . This being-with-one-another is not an additive result or an epiphenomenon of a multiplicity of Daseins, . . . On the contrary, it is because Dasein being-in-the-world is of itself being-with that there is something like a being-with-one-another."[\[8\]](#)
- ¶5. On the Cartesian-cum-Lockean model, "it is assumed that a subject is encapsulated within itself and now has the task of empathizing with another subject. This way of formulating the question is absurd."[\[9\]](#) Heidegger says:
- ¶6. when we dealt with being-in-the-world, we always spoke of concern as a proximally everyday concerned absorption in the world, in which the other is there with me. But there was no talk of a 'subject' and 'I' which stands over against an 'object' or 'not-I.'[\[10\]](#)
- ¶7. By making an ontological claim concerning being-in-the-world and being-with, Heidegger lets the Cartesian problem of the external world and the problem of other minds wither away.
- ¶8. "Self and world belong together in a single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, . . ."[\[11\]](#) According to Heidegger, the word "world" can be used in several ways. He draws our attention to four senses:

- ¶9.
1. "World" is used as an ontological term, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.
  2. "World" functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities which we have just mentioned . . .
  3. "World" can be used in another ontical sense . . . as that `wherein' factual Dasein can be said to `live' . . . : "world" may stand for the `public' we-world or one's own closest (domestic) environment.
  4. Finally, "world" designates the ontological-existential concept of worldhood. . . .[\[12\]](#)
- ¶10. The signification of the word "world" Heidegger has in mind for his own primary use is the third signification. It is the sense of the world in which Dasein dwells. It is the world in which Dasein encounters tools as ready-at-hand and other Daseins in a shared world. Dwelling implies familiarity and intimacy. "In" as in being-in "is derived from "innan"—"to reside", "habitare", "to dwell" [sich auf halten]. `An' signifies "I am accustomed", "I am familiar with", "I look after something".[\[13\]](#) Dwelling is the basic mode of Dasein's being-in-the-world. "In" as being-in-the-world should not be construed in the sense, say, of an object being in a box.[\[14\]](#) Being-in-the-world implies, among others, dealing with ready-at-hand tools, such as a hammer, or the south wind in the enviroing world of a farmer, and dealing with fellow Daseins with whom Dasein shares a form of life and a sense of solidarity. This is one of the reasons why Heidegger insists that "Being-in as an existientiale" should not be assimilated to "the category of `insideness' which things present-at-hand can have with regard to one another."[\[15\]](#) There is an ontological difference between the two according to Heidegger. Dwelling is Dasein's existientiale. The categories which apply to physical objects qua present-at-hand are inapposite to Dasein. "In" as in being-in which is "a state of Dasein's Being"[\[16\]](#) should not be construed on the Cartesian geometrical model. When two lovers are sitting next to each other in a deeply affectionate mood, this romantic sense of being next to each other could not possibly be conveyed by the application of the expression "side by side" (*nebeneinander*) as it applies to a spatial relation between physical substances.[\[17\]](#)

- ¶11. This move on the part of Heidegger is an essential part of his trying to make sense of what it means to be fully human. Here Heidegger shows a great insight. Let me expatiate on Heidegger's insight. At this juncture, one may raise the question: Can computers or even a brain in a vat be said to dwell in the world? Could computers and disembodied brains dance with joy or cry with sorrow? Could computers and disembodied brains be attuned to mood? Would it make sense to speak of computers and disembodied brains that certain computers and disembodied brains practice Mahayana Buddhism rather than Christianity? Would it make sense to say of certain computers and disembodied brains that they show the Four Beginnings (commiseration, shame, deference, and discernment) and the Seven Emotions (joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, hatred, and desire) because they are Confucian? It would be patently nonsensical to be engaged in some such talk. For this sort of gibberish would presuppose that computers and disembodied brains are fully human and capable of taking part in form of life. It seems inappropriate to apply Dasein's existentials of being-in-the-world to computers and brains. It seems that taking part in form of life in a distinctly human way requires, *inter alia*, embodiment. Thus Heidegger states: "Neutral Dasein is never what it exists; Dasein exists in each case only in the factual connection. . . . As factual, Dasein is, among other things, dispersed in a body."[\[18\]](#)
- ¶12. Concerning embodiment being essential to being fully human, there is a theme in Wittgenstein which resonates with Heidegger. Consider the following passage: "—It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious."[\[19\]](#) It is the unitary human being, not a brain, not a mind, not a body, that has visual experiences. Norman Malcolm expatiates on this insight of Wittgenstein's by way of making comments on John Searle. Malcolm observes: "John Searle is one of the philosophers who thinks that mental states of a person are states of the person's brain."[\[20\]](#) Indeed, those philosophers who identify mind with brain, as Searle evidently does when he says that "each of us is precisely a brain in a vat; . . ."[\[21\]](#) reify a brain in a manner reminiscent of Descartes' reification of the mind. As Malcolm observes, what Searle is saying is that "if the brain of a human being could be removed from the body, kept alive in a chemical vat and stimulated from electrical impulses, the brain could have beliefs, desires, sensations, and intentions."[\[22\]](#) Those who reify a brain as a virtually autonomous substance are latter-day materialist Cartesians. Malcolm continues to remark: "The fact that to say 'my brain is thirsty' is a comical remark, is philosophically significant . . . . A person who has just learned of some good news may be filled with joy. His face, his gestures, his speech, radiate joy. He may even dance with joy. Is his brain joyful? . . . The truth of course is that it is complete nonsense to apply the terms 'joyful', or 'thirsty', or 'visual perception' to a brain."[\[23\]](#) Wittgenstein further says: "But isn't it absurd to say of a body that it has pain? . . . In what sense is it true that my hand does not feel pain, but I in my hand?"[\[24\]](#) Is it the body that feels pain? . . . If someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face."[\[25\]](#) Pain is not an object to be located in a

part of a body but a state of a human being (sufferer). Again "Think of the recognition of facial expressions. Or of the description of facial expressions—which does not consist in giving the measurements of the face!"[\[26\]](#) It is a human being, not his/her face, which is expressive of feeling. It is the embodied and minded unitary human being that thinks, has sensations, moves, and has his/her being in the world. I might add that it is the fully human being, neither a brain in a vat, nor the Cartesian mind, nor a body, that takes part in form of life. At this juncture, Ryle and Strawson would nod in agreement.

- ¶13. "Being-in is not a 'property' which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, . . . Dasein is never . . . free from Being-in."[\[27\]](#) In *Poetry, Language, Thought*,[\[28\]](#) Heidegger says that dwelling means staying with earth, sky, divinities, and mortals (human beings) in simple unity. Heidegger's notion of dwelling expresses a sense of a mortal (human being) forming unity not only with other fellow mortals but also with earth, sky, and divinities who are "beckoning messengers of the godhead."[\[29\]](#) This phenomenological sense of forming unity with fellow human beings and earth and sky resonates with what Chang Tsai says in *The Western Inscription*. Chang Tsai says:

"Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst.

Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature.

All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions."[\[30\]](#)

- ¶14. This Heideggerian-cum-East Asian sense of cosmic harmony is an expression of aesthetic irenic fusionism. In connection with dwelling, Heidegger also says: "Mortals dwell in that they initiate their nature—their being capable of death as death—into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death."[\[31\]](#)
- ¶15. For Dasein to exist is to be able to become what it is not yet. For Heidegger, possibilities are prior to actualities. To be human is a happening (*Geschehen*). Precisely because human being is mortal and finite, human being is capable of self-creation. This point is the core of Heidegger's notion of *Seinkönnen*. If human being were a substance (which implies permanence and rest and having fixed nature), human being would not be capable of self-creation and self-transformation. Self-creation and self-transformation means authentic existence. For Heidegger, projecting oneself into the future (hence becoming authentic) means being situated in definite circumstances (e.g., a definite form of life and cultural background). Conversely, being situated and reclaiming the past facticity mean becoming what one is able to be. Hence "thrown possibility." The past, the present, and the future form a single unity, which is precisely what *Zeitlichkeit* (temporality) means. Heidegger says:

- ¶16. "Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities. . . . This is how . . . Dasein stands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen." [32]
- ¶17. Choices which individuals make are made within the framework of inherited social practices. For Heidegger, the trinitarian notions of "futural", "having-been", and "in the moment of vision" are inextricably interwoven with one another. "Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate—that is to say, authentic historicity." [33] Again Heidegger says:
- ¶18. "Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its `generation' goes to make up the full authentic historicizing of Dasein." [34]
- ¶19. Dasein's freedom is not a "free-floating" affair. Freedom is "finite freedom." What and how Dasein chooses has communal significance.
- ¶20. Reflection on Heidegger's notions of thrownness, projection, and human finitude leads me to ponder a theme in Confucianism which addresses what human beings are able to be by exerting supreme efforts notwithstanding human finitude and limitations.
- ¶21. According to Confucianism, acting righteously means *inter alia*, making supreme moral efforts. But there are patently limitations to human efforts. When Confucius faces the fatal illness of Jan Keng, he resigns himself to sadly accepting his disciple's death by saying that "Heaven has so ordained it." [35] A human being may exert his/her best efforts to have the Way prevail. And yet there are limitations to what even exceptional human beings, let alone "small men," can do, as evidenced by the example of Kung-po Liao, against "Heaven's will." [36] However, the value of making efforts lies not so much in scoring intended success as in making efforts in itself. Whether one's making efforts will culminate in success depends in part on conditions which are beyond one's control. What is beyond one's control is destiny (ming). The gate-keeper at the Stone Gates referred to Confucius as "the one who `knows it's no use, but keeps on doing it', . . ." [37] Why would Confucius keep on doing it unless what matters really in the end is doing what is righteous and being a human being of probity? For example, "a gentleman's service to his country consists in doing such right as he can. That the Way does not prevail, he knows well enough

beforehand."[\[38\]](#) And who knows what is supposed to be "no use" may turn out to be quite an effective way of changing "fate" or "the inevitable"? Destiny (*ming*) is not something with intrinsic nature and force of its own. Rather destiny is anything that turns out to be beyond human control under specific circumstances whether it be the fatal illness of Jan Keng or the futility of the attempts of a "small man" to change the course of history. When Confucius says that at 50 human being understands the mandate of Heaven (*T`ien ming*), what he means is that human being does realize the finitude of life, but this does not or should not deter anyone from making efforts for self-realization until one reaches the age of 70 at which one symbolically achieves the harmony of one's heart's desires with the rhythm of nature.

- ¶22. The phrase "heavenly destiny" has a double-edged connotation. First, it means what is beyond anyone's control such as the finitude of life. Second, it has the positive sense of what a human being is able to be in spite of (or because of) finitude. When it is said that "he who does not understand the will of Heaven cannot be regarded as a gentleman,"[\[39\]](#) "the will of Heaven" means what is imparted to a human being, that is, what he/she is able to be. According to Confucianism, whether one does succeed in perfecting oneself depends largely on one's own determination, efforts, single-mindedness, and dedication, that is, exerting one's supreme efforts. If one's circumstances are not as fortunate as those of others and if one's native talents are not as great as those of others, that is all the more reason for making supreme efforts for overcoming the adversity. Confucianism teaches that every human being is capable of attaining sagehood, that is, becoming fully human. Whatever the initial, differentiating conditions may be, "when the achievement is made, it comes to the same thing."[\[40\]](#) Confucianism teaches that what is assumed to be given can be overcome by what one is able to be. In other words, that to which one is (assumed to be) "thrown" can be overcome by human efforts for self-realization and self-creation. No other form of humanism accords greater dignity and worth to human capacity for becoming fully human than Confucianism. This sense of human capacity is echoed by Heidegger's view that possibilities are prior to actualities.
- ¶23. The second and positive sense of "heavenly destiny" is evident in the following passage:
- ¶24. "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven. To preserve one's mind and to nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven. Not to allow any double-mindedness regardless of longevity or brevity of life, but to cultivate one's person and wait for [destiny (*ming*), . . .] . . .] is the way to fulfill one's destiny."[\[41\]](#)

- ¶25. Here "knowing one's nature" is associated not with theoretical contemplation of the self but with making maximum efforts for self-realization of finite being. The Confucian sense of understanding or knowing one's nature is being able to become fully human. If to exert one's utmost is to understand one's nature and to understand one's nature is to know Heaven, understanding one's nature and understanding Heaven are co-extensive. In other words, knowing one's nature and knowing Heaven are the selfsame process of self-realization through self-cultivation, study, and utmost exertion of self-efforts. Which leads Mencius to say: "All things are already in oneself. There is no greater joy than to examine oneself and be sincere." [42]
- ¶26. Mencius gives expression to the interlacedness of double-edged "*ming*" in the following passage:
- ¶27. "Though nothing happens that is not due to destiny, one accepts willingly only what is one's proper destiny. That is why he who understands destiny does not stand under a wall on the verge of collapse. He who dies after having done his best in following the Way does according to his proper destiny." [43]
- ¶28. Thus accepting one's proper destiny is the culminating moment of doing one's best for self-realization and being what one is able to become. There are clear-cut cases of "given" destiny (*ming*) such as one's death. Yet there are many things one can achieve by projecting oneself. There are no antecedently given limits to what one can do by way of self-creation. For
- "whether he is going to die young or to live to a ripe age makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected character that he stands firm on his proper destiny." [44]
- ¶29. One awaits one's proper destiny, so that, to paraphrase Heidegger, there may be a good death.
- ¶30. Let us come back to Heidegger. One interesting aspect of Heidegger's way of dealing with the Cartesian-cum-Lockean conception of the relation of the self with the world is his way of criticizing a form of phenomenalism. Heidegger highlights hearing. Heidegger says:

- ¶31. "‘originally and to begin with’, one does not really hear noises and sonorous complexes, but the creaking wagon, the ‘electric’ [streetcar], the motorcycle, the column on the march, the north wind. To ‘hear’ something like a ‘pure noise’ already requires a very artificial and complicated attitude." [\[45\]](#)
- ¶32. What Heidegger says here is that since "we are first always already involved with the world," we "right from the start" [\[46\]](#) hear real things which we recognize in terms of structure instead of sensing nonconceptual (‘pure’) noises. And hearing the creaking wagon, the column on the march and the north directly and recognizing them as such, and not "logically constructing" the real things out of nonconceptual *sensa*, presupposes an intersubjective conceptual framework which we share with other members of our community. The idea (of phenomenism) that we first hear a ‘pure noise,’ and not the creaking wagon, the north wind, and the like reflects a "very artificial and complicated attitude." Phenomenism is an invention of certain philosophers with a "very artificial and complicated attitude" who are not in touch with reality and life. The truth of the matter is that "there is phonetic speaking only because there is a possibility of discourse. . . . Even hearkening is phenomenally more original than the mere tones and perceiving of sounds." In real life, one does not hear a ‘pure sound’ but real things. The thing language is more basic than and conceptually prior to the *sensum* language. "Hearing belongs to discoursing as being-with belongs to being-in-the-world." [\[47\]](#)
- ¶33. From Heidegger's perspective, the Cartesian-cum-Lockean conception of the problem of other minds is on a par with its conception of the external world and faces the same sort of difficulty. Just as the phenomenal (*sensum*) language would not be coherent without presupposing the conceptually more basic thing language, so the argument from analogy typically used for "proving" other minds "appears to work only if the question it is designed to answer is begged." [\[48\]](#) Unless one presupposes that the relation between other minds and other bodies is similar to the relation between one's mind and one's body and unless one further assumes that the way in which other minds and other bodies function is similar to the way in which one's own mind and body function, one could not possibly infer to the existence of other minds and the way in which they function in relation to their bodies. As Heidegger phrases the matter, "The Other would be a duplicate of the Self." [\[49\]](#) Heidegger displaces the debate about other minds (as based on the argument from analogy).

- ¶34. As is the case with the anti-Cartesian Ryle, Strawson, and Wittgenstein, for Heidegger dividing a wholesome human being into two distinct substances is a misguided enterprise. Heidegger would sympathize with Strawson's view that the concept of a person is a primitive concept. It is just that if Strawson tends to view a person as a substance in an Aristotelian sense to which mental as well as physical predicates can be ascribed, for Heidegger Dasein is a happening (*Geschehen*) or a process. It is in the disclosure of possibilities that the sense of what it means to be human (Dasein) is illuminated. "The essence ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. . . . The essence of Dasein lies in its existence."[\[50\]](#) Existence is tied up with what Dasein is able to be (Seinkoennen). Interestingly, by citing a passage from Mou Zongsan, David L. Hall and Roger T. Adams give an interpretation of "what Confucius and Mencius mean by *xing* [conventionally translated as "nature"] . . . and to exhaust this *xing* (*jin xing* ), . . ."[\[51\]](#) along what I take to be a Heideggerian line. They say:
- ¶35. "What it means to be human is an ongoing historical and cultural narrative. Further, the world-in-process that shapes and is shaped by this human creativity," that is, "exhausting one's *xing*," "is always open, always provisional, always changeable, always in some degree unique disclosure . . .—"process" words are more appropriate for describing the human "task" of continuously going beyond one's present conditions. Process words are a language of continuing disclosure and aspiration."[\[52\]](#)
- ¶36. I am drawn to this line of interpreting the Confucianist (Confucian-cum-Mencian) notion of *xing* and exhausting one's *xing*.
- ¶37. For Heidegger, "Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather an existentiell modification of the "they"—of the "they" as an essential existentielle."[\[53\]](#) Dasein qua authentic is not a worldless or otherless, detached, isolated atomic individual. Dasein is always being-in-the-world and being-with-others. In Confucianism, there is a theme which resonates with Heidegger's sense of authentic Dasein. For the traditional East Asians, neither the problem of the external world nor the problem of other minds has been a problem. Epistemology in the modern Western sense has never been a prominent issue. And atomic individualism has never been a viable notion. Being-in-the-world and being-with-others have always already been taken for granted.

- ¶38. What resonates with Heidegger's sense of authenticity is what William Theodore de Bary calls "moral individualism" [54] in Confucianism. Confucianism stresses the initiative of every person for undertaking the lifelong process of self-cultivation and self-realization. However, Confucianism stresses mutual cooperation and encouragement. A person is fully human only if he/she performs his/her fitting role(s) in the network of interpersonal relationships. To paraphrase Heidegger, a human being is what he/she does. Yet there is a sense in which individuality is the locus of self-fulfillment, self-realization, and personal accountability for each human being.
- ¶39. The individual is the initiator in setting his/her mind on learning at the age of 15 and the self-determined subject of self-discovery, self-realization, and self-fulfillment. The point of departure is learning for the sake of self-improvement. "The Master said, in old days men studied for the sake of self-improvement; nowadays men study in order to impress other people." [55] The end of learning for self-improvement is finding the Way in oneself. But in the Confucianist framework, being true to oneself necessarily entails regarding others' hearts/minds as one would regard one's own heart/mind. As the coupling of *chung* (being loyal) and *shu* (treating others' hearts/minds as one treats one's own) suggests, one should not differentiate others' hearts/minds from one's own. If for Heidegger being-in-the-world entails being-with-others, in Confucianism, being-in-the-world entails nondifferentiation of others from oneself. Learning for the sake of self-improvement (*wei chi*) is essentially related to helping others complete and realize themselves as well as striving to complete and realize oneself. Which entails unselfish impartiality and performance of righteous actions. Therefore learning for the sake of self-improvement should be distinguished from learning for the sake of impressing others which is nothing but satisfying selfish desires. That is why Confucius' admonition as to overcoming oneself (getting rid of selfish desires) and returning to propriety is quite central to the Confucianist Way.
- ¶40. To perceive oneself in abstraction from one's proper social roles and interpersonal relations, that is, in abstraction from the Confucianist sense of being-with, as based on a sense of trust and responsibility, is to be selfish. What underlies the Confucianist mode of being-with is (1) the sense of relatedness and interdependence of human beings; (2) the social nature of self-growth and self-fulfillment; (3) the necessary interdependence of one's self-fulfillment and others' self-fulfillment as the spontaneous basis of social equilibrium; (4) the moral education and enlightenment of members of society as the primary basis of social harmony and order. To use Heideggerese, being an authentic self is inseparable from being-with-others. So in Confucianism social holism is not only compatible with "moral individualism," but the former presupposes the latter in that harmonious and constructive social relations can be formed, developed, and maintained only if members of society voluntarily engage in self-cultivation and moral education and assume of their own accord fitting social roles and responsibilities. Call this theme in Confucianism holistic individualism, which echoes the Heideggerian sense of authenticity. There are two prominent concepts which are relevant to the Confucianist sense of authenticity: *tzu*

*jen* and *tzu te*.

- ¶41. The reference to *tzu jen* (assuming a responsibility of one's own accord) is to be found in the book of *Mencius*, 5B: 1 in which the phrase "assuming the responsibility of taking care of the Empire of his own accord" occurs. The self-assumed responsibility of "those who first attain understanding" includes "the duty of awakening those who are slow to understand," and the responsibility of "those who are the first to awaken" includes "the duty of awakening those who are slow to awaken." [56] As a paradigmatical example of *tzu jen*, Confucius' willingness and ability to perform timely actions according to circumstances are mentioned. "Confucius was the sage whose actions were timely. Confucius was the one who gathered together all that was good. To do this is to open with bells and conclude with jade tubes." [57] To assume one's appropriate responsibility of one's own accord in the manner in which Confucius does, one needs wisdom as skill and sagemess as strength. To perform situationally fitting actions of one's own accord is precisely what is meant by performing righteous actions. The cumulative effect of performing righteous actions is for one's "flood-like *ch'i*" to "fill the space between Heaven and Earth. It is a *ch'i* which unites rightness with the Way." [58] If for Heidegger the resoluteness of *Dasein* qua authentic becomes manifest in being-unto-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*), according to Confucianism, the authenticity of those who understand and awaken before others do is evidenced by the cosmic energy (*ch'i*) which fills and pervades all nature between Heaven and Earth.
- ¶42. Now we turn to *tzu te*, that is, acquiring (knowledge of) the Way by and for oneself. [59] Acquiring the Way is primarily hermeneutical and practical understanding of cultural tradition. Traditionally in East Asia, it has typically involved studying the Classics and the spirit of the sages expressed therein. Each and every human being must acquire the Way by and for oneself. In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, it is said: "Study it (the way to be sincere) extensively, inquire into it accurately, think over it carefully, sift it clearly, and practice it earnestly." [60] To acquiring the Way by and for oneself, for some painfully, the principle of substitutability does not apply any more than the principle applies to *Dasein*'s sense of being-unto-death for Heidegger. Even if hermeneutical and practical understanding of a cultural tradition is intersubjective in that the cultural legacy and form of life of a cultural group are shared by members of the cultural group, there is nevertheless an intensely existential element in the process of acquiring the Way. "Students must find things out for themselves. . . . As students find their way, each establishes his own gate, and then returns home to conduct his inquiries himself." [61] Without "bodily experience" which involves the total person, the Way cannot be (even painfully) acquired. Wisdom cannot be forcedly acquired any more than the growth of plants can be accentuated by pulling them up. Dancing with one's hands and feet is a spontaneous expression of joy which is supervenient on acquiring the Way and wisdom by and for oneself. Heidegger's term "*Fuersorge*" which is associated with *Mitsein* may be rendered as caring for or caring about. Olafson suggests the Greek *agape* which "has

much richer nuances of meaning," and "acknowledges our shared condition of life and our profound similarities across all the lines that normally divide us." [62] He wants to equate "caring-for" with *agape* because "caring-for" seems to express "the kind of perception and feeling for one another that the word *agape* expresses." [63] *Mitsein* also suggests the sort of "mutuality that makes another's happiness a condition, in some significant sense, of one's own." [64] This is precisely the sort of mutual countenancing that Confucianism teaches. Self-fulfillment is an essential condition for any human being's happiness. So if one aspires to achieve a fulfilling life, so do others. That is why we should help others achieve their goals and aspirations in life. Treat others' hearts/minds as you would treat your own heart/mind. This is the Confucian notion of *chung shu*. "What you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to them." [65] The Golden Rule stated here is not merely negative. As Wing-tsit Chan ably comments, "However, the golden rule here is positively stated, that is, to do to others what one expects others to do him." [66] The Confucian Golden Rule recognizes the interdependence of human beings. Similarly, what is at the heart of Heidegger's *Mitsein* is the recognition of the interdependence of human beings. "Human beings reach their full powers only with the assistance of others and even then stand in need of the support and recognition that others can give them." [67]

- ¶43. The sense of mutuality that Olafson finds in Heidegger's *Fuersorge* resonates with the Confucianist sense of deference. To defer and yield to others is to appreciate the uniqueness and excellence of each individual in a mutually enfolding sort of way. To yield is to "let be," which finds expression in Heidegger's *Gelassenheit*. According to Hall and Ames,
- ¶44. "The central focus of both Confucian and Daoist ways of thinking is the form of engagement we would call deference. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in a recognition of a particular focus (*de*). Deferential acts require that one put oneself in another's place." [68]
- ¶45. The idea of deference is the very expression of the Confucianist virtue of propriety (*li*). But as is the case with most other East Asian philosophical and religious concepts, this idea is Taoist as well. There are very few, if any indeed, exclusive sorts of intracultural transcategorical concepts in East Asian thought(s). If *wutzu* (no-knowledge) provides one with a sense of *de* (virtue, excellence, strength) of each unique focus or individual, then *wuwei* (no-action) entails nonassertive action which leads to complementarity and coordination. Similarly, *wuyü* (no-desire) entails enjoying fellow human beings and other natural beings for what they are without controlling or manipulating or possessing them. [69] *Wuyü* finds an echo in *Gelassenheit*. A community is a field of foci (individuals with "insistent particularity") or *Daseins*. *Wuyü* becomes manifest particularly in Chuang Tzu's *ch'i wu* ("parity among things," "making all things equal," or "self-arrangement among things," etc.). In chapter 2 of *Chuang Tzu*, it is said that myriad entities are piping

harmoniously and yet "each can be its own."[\[70\]](#)

- ¶46. At this point, it would be apposite and suggestive to recall the well-known Buddhist metaphor of the jewel net of the god Indra into which are set an infinite number of gems mirroring one another. The happening of mutual mirroring is the field, each gem (focus) reflecting the field from its unique perspective, thus symbolizing the dependent co-origination of myriad entities. Even if each gem becomes in some sense "selfless" in the process of mutual mirroring, each focus reflects the field from its unique perspective. Is not this field the very East Asian (Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucianist) sense of Nothingness (the Void)? Tao is Nothingness. *T'ien* is Nothingness. Tao, whether it be Taoist or Confucianist, reflects or simply is the rhythm of natural and spontaneous changes and the phenomenon of mutually mirroring myriad entities (or unique foci).
- ¶47. And this sense of Nothingness seems to resonate with the Heideggerian sense of *Sein*. Interpreting across cultures, in his book *Eclipse of the Self*,[\[71\]](#) Michael E. Zimmerman draws a close parallel between Buddhism-*cum*-Taoism and Heidegger. He relates Heidegger's notion of *Ereignis* (appropriation) to the Buddhist notion of dependent co-origination. "Hence, *Ereignis* refers to the mutual appropriating of the elements of the world."[\[72\]](#) According to Zimmerman, Heidegger holds the view that the world is constituted by the mutual mirroring of its elements. Here Heidegger seems to echo the East Asian sense of field-*cum*-foci. Zimmerman says that for Heidegger, mutual appropriating means being unlocked or being opened up. In this Heideggerian-*cum*-East Asian world, unlike their Leibnizian nominal counterparts, monads (foci) are, instead of being windowless, opening up to one another for mutual mirroring and illuminating, each focus (monad) reflecting the field (Tao, *T'ien*, *Sunyata*, *Sein*) in a unique way. Zimmerman reminds us that there is etymological affinity between the word "*Entschlossenheit*" ("resolution") and the word "*Erschlossenheit*" ("discloseness"), both of which Heidegger uses in *Sein und Zeit*. The word "*entschliessen*" also means opening with a key, that is, unlocking. What Zimmerman is suggesting here is that even the "early" Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*, let alone the "later" Heidegger, was virtually Buddhist, or more broadly, East Asian.[\[73\]](#) Zimmerman concludes: "To follow the *Tao* and to hearken to the *Logos* mean "the same": to be cleared of the ego and to be attuned to the cosmic play which is hidden from the rational intellect."[\[74\]](#) Interpreting across cultures, Zimmerman says that *Tao*, *Logos*, *Sunyata*, and *Ereignis* are virtually "the same" giving expression to the Void (or Nothingness).[\[75\]](#) Zimmerman quotes Capra with approval as saying: ". . . the "field" corresponds to the Void."[\[76\]](#) *Tao*, *Sunyata*, *Logos* (in a Heraclitean sense), or Heidegger's *Sein* is not the overarching and monolithic Being behind beings in the Platonic sense providing the preset structure and telos of beings but is simply the happening of natural and spontaneous changes. The pairing of the concepts of field and focus, as applied to community and human being, seems to suggest the complementary mutuality of community and individual (hence Dewey's expression "social individual" and Mead's phrase "social self"). In other words, the focal

involvement of each human being in helping to create and enhance synergistically communal goals and ambience helps to appreciate the unique virtue, strength, and excellence of each individual human being.

- ¶48. As a compelling example of the way in which people devote their lives to the well-being of others, Olafson draws our attention to the way in which "people devote their lives to the well-being of their families," [77] which evinces a deep sense of responsibility, trust, and unselfishness. That people care for and care about their families before they do care about strangers seems to transcend cultural boundaries. If one cares for and cares about one's family, one can gradually extend circles of those one cares about. Hence the importance of Chu Hsi's *Reflections on Things at Hand*. One should begin with self-cultivation. Then one can naturally regulate the family, helps bring order in the state and peace in the world until one forms one body with the entire universe. This is what Confucianism has been teaching, as witness the *Great Learning*. The sense of *agape* that Olafson locates in Heidegger in the form of *Fuersorge* finds its intercultural counterpart in the Confucian notion of *ren*. *Ren* is "to love men." [78]
- ¶49. For Heidegger, the expression "Being-with (*Mitsein*)," "Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*)," and "with-world (*Mitwelt*)" are inextricably interwoven with one another. "Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance." [79] "Considerateness" is a translation of *Ruecksicht*, and "forbearance" is a translation of *Nachsicht*. These two concepts hang together with *Umsicht* (circumspection). Of *Ruecksicht* and *Nachsicht* Magda King gives the following interpretation:
- ¶50. "*Ruecksicht* therefore means an understanding that lies in looking back . . . On thrownness and dependence upon a world that has to be taken care of. But thrownness is in itself a thrownness-with and for other; the world has to be taken care of with and for the other. This "looking-back" understanding is evidently the guide of the "jumping-in" mode of caring-for. . . *Nachsicht* is accordingly an understanding that lies in looking toward or to something." [80] *Ruecksicht* and *Nachsicht* are, just as *Umsicht* is, related to "worldhood as that referential totality which constitutes significance (Section 18). In Being-familiar with this significance and previously understanding it, Dasein lets what is ready-to-hand be encountered as discovered in its involvement. . . . Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, . . . Thus as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others. . . . Others are not Things, but show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, . . . In concerned solicitude the Other is proximally disclosed." [81]

- ¶51. For Heidegger, as for Confucianists, a meaningful world is constituted primarily by "thick" relations.
- ¶52. For Heidegger, there is a close parallel between the referential totality of ready-to-hand equipment and the meaningful world of role-playing human beings. Guignon gives the following functional interpretation of Dasein:
- ¶53. "Dasein, as concrete Being-in-the-world, always exists as a specific role "for the sake of which it is." . . . The fact that Dasein just is the roles it takes over in existing carries with it certain implications. Roles do not exist in isolation; they gain their definition and meaning from their relations to other roles. . . . Being-with characterizes Dasein as essentially related to others in the field of meanings of the social world."[\[82\]](#)
- ¶54. Heidegger states: "The referential whole of the world is a whole of meaningful connections, meaningfulness."[\[83\]](#) Though Heidegger draws our attention to four senses of the word "world," the sense in which he uses the term means "that `wherein' a factual Dasein as such can be said to `live'."[\[84\]](#) The world is a totality of meaningfulness.
- ¶55. "Dasein finds `itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids—in those things environmentally ready-at-hand with which it is proximally concerned."[\[85\]](#) "To exist then means, among other things, to be comporting with beings [*sich verhaltendes Sein be Seiendem*]."[\[86\]](#) Heidegger's "nonthematic absorption"[\[87\]](#) which is not "blind" but "has its own kind of sight," namely "circumspection"[\[88\]](#) is related to Dasein's dealing with equipment. Yet what is true of *Umsicht* is equally true of *Ruecksicht* and *Nachsicht*. *Ruecksicht* and *Nachsicht* as well as *Umsicht* are skills acquired through social practice. "‘Practical’ behavior is not `atheoretical' in the sense of "sightlessness."[\[89\]](#) However, `practical' behavior is not "theoretical behavior" either because "theoretical behavior is just looking, without circumspection."[\[90\]](#) Heidegger's view that "sights" are acquired through social practice resonates with Wittgenstein's view that 'obeying a rule' is a practice.[\[91\]](#) For both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, understanding is primarily a matter of knowing-how rather than knowing-that.

- ¶56. The Heideggerian conception of human beings which views them in terms of role-playing echoes the Confucianist notion of human beings as regards performance of socially fitting roles which finds expression in the concept of the rectification of names. Just as for Heidegger, the meaning of a sign is its use in its proper equipmental context, so for both Heidegger and Confucianists, a human being is a human being in virtue of the roles he/she plays in proper social contexts. This sort of functional interpretation of equipment and human beings is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's conception of meaning as use.
- ¶57. Confucianism has its own way of giving an account of pattern-governed behavior, as exemplified by *li* (ritual). Ritual "in the widest sense is the totality of social conventions."[\[92\]](#) The word "*li*" "embraces all rites, custom, manners, conventions, from the sacrifices to ancestors down to the detail of social etiquette."[\[93\]](#) Ritual stands for the good form of behavior, achieved through self-cultivation, study, and practice, as attuned to patterns of custom, culture, and tradition, that is, form of life. In the tradition of Confucianism, ritual is often compared to music and dance. That is because performing ritual actions is, as being engaged in dancing or playing music, a skill which is acquired through social practice and helps to achieve group harmony. Ritual performers, dancers, and musicians alike develop the sort of skills which would enable them to get engaged in their activities unreflectively but not blindly. Their behaviors are pattern-governed behaviors. Just as Heidegger speaks of the "sight" that "guides" the carpenter, so Confucius says that if performance of ritual or music is not to be empty and vacuous, it should be inspired by *ren*. Just as for Wittgensteinians, rules are better lived than described, and just as for Heideggerians, to be engaged in hammering is "to have a skilled understanding of our culture,"[\[94\]](#) so for Confucianists, ritual activities are better done than talked about. For Confucianists, as Eno aptly observes, "wisdom is not 'knowing-that'; it is 'knowing-how'."[\[95\]](#) A practiced ritual performer, just as a skilled carpenter, is "master of a technique."
- ¶58. In his highly critical book on Heidegger, Herman Philipse observes that Heidegger affirms the primacy of the manifest image over the scientific image.[\[96\]](#) In this connection, Philipse makes roughly two points. First, Heidegger is right in supposing that the richness and complexity of experiences of daily life cannot be captured in terms of any language of science. Heidegger "argues in section 20 of *Sein und Zeit* that it is impossible to understand the meaningful world of daily life on the basis of the scientific image."[\[97\]](#) "In projecting the scientific view of the world, we skip (*überspringen*) the world as it is in daily existence in which we live and work. Heidegger claims that the meaningful world of daily existence is the world as it is "in itself".[\[98\]](#) Indeed, the view rightly imputed here by Philipse to Heidegger is one of the most profound insights gained and conveyed by Heidegger.[\[99\]](#) Second, Philipse correctly reports that classical naturalism as represented by Descartes assumes that the manifest image which Philipse equates with common sense and the scientific

image which he equates with physics are incompatible with each other, and the "philosopher-scientists of the seventeenth century opted for the primacy of the scientific image. Physics would characterize the material world as it is. If physics contradicts common sense, common sense must be mistaken." [100] In fact, the basic points of classical naturalism are echoed in the contemporary scene by Wilfrid Sellars' scientific realism. According to Sellars, whereas the manifest image is methodologically prior to the scientific image, the scientific image is ontologically prior to the manifest image which is in the end false.

¶59. According to Philipse, Heidegger endorses the incompatibility thesis and argues "that the meaningful world of everyday life (*Alltaeglichkeit*) is more fundamental than the scientific image." [101] In connection with what Philipse calls Heidegger's "antinaturalist decision", Philipse says that "the term *Entwurf* suggests that the scientific view of the world is optional." [102] Philipse further observes that for Heidegger, "the scientific image is derived, impoverished, and even false in a sense." [103] Let us assume that for Heidegger, *die Ontologie der Vorhandenheit* is "meaningless," in the sense that it is irrelevant to phenomenological description of daily life as it is "in itself." But from this it does not follow that it is "false" in the same sense in which according to classical naturalism which is a form of representationalism or realism, the manifest image is false. When classical naturalism or Sellars claims that the scientific image is true, what it (or he) means is that the scientific image pictures what is "really, real," namely the ultimate reality (in a monolithic sense of "reality"). If Heidegger says, as suggested by Philipse, that the scientific image is "false" in the realist sense of "false," Heidegger is not only inconsistent with his tendency to let the debate about realism and anti-realism wither away but is being plainly regressive.

¶60. For the truth of the matter is that the scientific image is not optional. Nor is it the case that it is "false." It is a patent fact that there is a place for the scientific image. Perhaps it is misguided to suppose, either in the manner of classical naturalism (or Sellars) or in the manner of Philipse's Heidegger, that the manifest image and the scientific image are at odds with each other. For some, such a supposition can sensibly be diagnosed as what Heidegger might regard as an archaic remnant of the traditional metaphysical obsession with what is "really real." Has Heidegger (for that matter, Wittgenstein) not helped displace some such obsession? The manifest image has to do with the way human beings live, work, feel, move, and have their being. There are, Sellars' monolithic conception of the manifest image notwithstanding, as many different manifest images as there are forms and ways of life, just as there are as many different scientific images as there are sciences. And languages of manifest images and languages of scientific images need not be incompatible with each other. According to the later Wittgenstein and the young Heidegger, language is a tool. As Wittgenstein observes, there is a multiplicity of language-games. And different languages are different tools serving different purposes, just as a hammer and a bulldozer are different tools.

- ¶61. Specifically, "Mentalism might contain the scientific 1psychological truths about the underlying causal conditions of the mind's activities, and Wittgenstein's view could be the correct description of mental activity from the point of view of folk psychology." [104] However, "conceding Mentalism in scientific psychology is not the same thing as conceding the mind's self-containedness with respect to the body. Conceding the computational approach in scientific psychology is not the same thing as conceding that this delivers an adequate conception of the folk psychological mind." [105]
- ¶62. The view that it is impossible for scientific psychology or (projected) neurophysiology to capture the full sense of the "folk psychological mind" fits in nicely with Heidegger's general view that it is impossible to capture and understand the meaningful world of daily life within the framework of the scientific image. If we remember Wittgenstein's distinction between explanation and description, it seems sensible to conclude that scientific causal explanation should not be conflated or confused with phenomenological description of daily life as it is "in itself." If our primary interest is phenomenological description of daily life, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, it is true to say that "our considerations could not be scientific ones. . . . We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." [106] For example, (projected) neurophysiology might provide causal explanation of the mental, but it would not be fit for phenomenological description of the mental. (Projected) talk of neurophysiology would not be apposite to talk of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Emotions. In fine, the scientific image does not make a nice fit with talk of being-in-the-world.

## END NOTES

1. I borrow the expression from Charles B. Guignon, *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company (1983). I propose to modify the term "the Cartesian model" as the Cartesian-cum-Lockean model.
2. I borrow the expression "the manifest image" and the expression "the scientific image" from Wilfrid Sellars, *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man in Science, Perception and Reality* New York: Humanities Press, Inc. (1963).
3. Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, translated by Michael Heim, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1992), 169.

- [4.](#) *ibid.*, 170.
- [5.](#) *ibid.*, 170.
- [6.](#) Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, translated by Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1985), 238.
- [7.](#) *ibid.*, 238.
- [8.](#) *ibid.*, 239.
- [9.](#) *ibid.*, 243.
- [10.](#) *ibid.*, 238.
- [11.](#) Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translated by Albert Hostadter, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1988), 297.
- [12.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 225. This is a translation of Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag (1963), 181 (Hereafter, SZ)
- [13.](#) *ibid.*, 80, SZ, 54.
- [14.](#) David E. Cooper makes the following observation: "I am not, 'in-the-world' as a pea in a pod, but more in the sense that someone is in the world of motor-racing or fashion. It is a matter of engagement, not location." David E. Cooper, *Heidegger*, London: Claridge Press (1996), 25.
- [15.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 82, SZ, 56.
- [16.](#) *ibid.*, 79, SZ, 54.

- [17.](#) Along a similar line of thinking, Frederick A. Olafson says: ”“Side by side“ as applied to physical substances ”here connotes an external relation“ between ”distinct unit-entities with their own nonrelational properties. . . . When a human being is conceived on this model, . . . the body and the soul or mind-are conceived as substances; . . . in the kind of mutual externality that is entailed by this kind of thought.“ Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Grounds of Ethics*, Cambridge, UK/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press (1998), 17. Hubert L. Dreyfus makes the following observation: “Objects can touch in the sense of physical contact (a metaphorical sense), but they cannot touch each other in the sense of mattering to each other (a literal sense). Dasein alone can be touched, that is, moved by objects and other Daseins.” Humbert L. Dreyfus, *Being-In-The-World*, Cambridge, Massachusetts/Cambridge, England: The MIT Press (1997), 44.
- [18.](#) Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, translated by Michael Heim, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1992), 137.
- [19.](#) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, UK/Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. (1997), 281.
- [20.](#) Norman Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: Nothing Is Hidden*, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell (1988), 183.
- [21.](#) John Searle, *Intentionality*, New York: Cambridge University Press (1983), 230. This passage is quoted in Malcolm, Wittgenstein, 185.
- [22.](#) Norman Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: Nothing Is Hidden*, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell (1988), 185.
- [23.](#) *ibid.*, 184.
- [24.](#) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, UK/Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. (1997), 286.
- [25.](#) *ibid.*, 286.
- [26.](#) *ibid.*, 285.

- [27.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 84, SZ, 57.
- [28.](#) Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, translated by Albert Hofstader, New York: Harper Colophon Books Harper & Row, Publishers (1975), 151.
- [29.](#) *ibid.*, 150.
- [30.](#) Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1963), 497.
- [31.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, translated by Albert Hofstader, New York: Harper Colophon Books Harper & Row, Publishers (1975), 151.
- [32.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 435; SZ, 384.
- [33.](#) *ibid.*, 437; SZ, 385.
- [34.](#) *ibid.*, 436; SZ, 384-385.
- [35.](#) *The Analects of Confucius*, translated by Arthur Waley, New York: Vintage Books (1989), 6:8, 117.
- [36.](#) *ibid.*, 14:38, 189-190.
- [37.](#) *ibid.*, 14:41, 190.
- [38.](#) *ibid.*, 18:7, 221.
- [39.](#) *ibid.*, 20:3, 233.

- [40.](#) The Doctrine of the Mean, 20; Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1963), 105.
- [41.](#) Mencius, 7A:1; *ibid.*, 78.
- [42.](#) *Mencius*, translated by D Lau, New York: Penguin Books (1970), 7A:1, 82.
- [43.](#) *ibid.*, 7A:2, 182.
- [44.](#) *ibid.*, 7A:1, 182.
- [45.](#) Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, translated by Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1985), 266.
- [46.](#) *ibid.*, 266.
- [47.](#) *ibid.*, 267.
- [48.](#) Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, London/New York: Routledge (1996), 64.
- [49.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 162; SZ, 124.
- [50.](#) *ibid.*, 67; SZ, 42.
- [51.](#) David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking from the Han*, State University of New York (1998), 229.
- [52.](#) *ibid.*, 229.
- [53.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 168; SZ, 130.

- [54.](#) Cf. Wm Theodore De Bary, *The Liberal Tradition in China*, New York: Columbia University Press (1983).
- [55.](#) *The Analects of Confucius*, translated by Arthur Waley, New York: Vintage Books (1989), 14:25, 187.
- [56.](#) *Mencius*, translated by D Lau, New York: Penguin Books (1970), 5 B:1, 149-150.
- [57.](#) *ibid.*, 5B:1, 150.
- [58.](#) *ibid.*, 2A:2, 77.
- [59.](#) Cf. *ibid.*, 4B:14, 130.
- [60.](#) Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1963), 107.
- [61.](#) Chi Hsi and Lu Tsu-Ch'ien, *Reflections on Things at Hand*, translated by Wing-Tsit Chan, New York: Columbia University Press (2004), 97.
- [62.](#) Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Grounds of Ethics*, Cambridge, UK/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press (1998), 83.
- [63.](#) *ibid.*, 84.
- [64.](#) *ibid.*, 85.
- [65.](#) The Doctrine of the Mean, 13; Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1963), 101.
- [66.](#) *ibid.*, 101.
- [67.](#) Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Grounds of Ethics*, Cambridge, UK/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press (1998), 90.

- [68.](#) David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking from the Han*, State University of New York (1998), 46.
- [69.](#) See *ibid.*, Chapter 3 for their discussion of wu-forms.
- [70.](#) Chuang-tzu, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, translated by Burton Watson, New York: Columbia Press (1968), 38.
- [71.](#) Michael Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self*, Athens: Ohio University Press (1981).
- [72.](#) Chuang-tzu, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, translated by Burton Watson, New York: Columbia Press (1968), 236.
- [73.](#) In his revealing book, Reinhard May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work*, translated by Graham Parkes, London/New York: Routledge (1996), Richard May observes that in his “later” writings Heidegger practically lifted passages out of Buddhist and Taoist writings. May backs up his claim with pertinent documentation. I think May's interpretation is persuasive
- [74.](#) Michael Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self*, Athens: Ohio University Press (1981), 256.
- [75.](#) *ibid.*, 260.
- [76.](#) *ibid.*, 257.
- [77.](#) Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Grounds of Ethics*, Cambridge, UK/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press (1998), 87.
- [78.](#) The Analects, 12:22; Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1963), 40.
- [79.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 159; SZ, 123.

- [80.](#) Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time*, J. Llewlyn (Ed.), Albany: State University of New York (2001), 78.
- [81.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 16-161; SZ, 123-124.
- [82.](#) Charles B. Guignon, *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company (1983), 105-106.
- [83.](#) Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, translated by Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1985), 209-210.
- [84.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 93; SZ, 65.
- [85.](#) *ibid.*, 155; SZ, 119.
- [86.](#) Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translated by Albert Hostadter, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1988), 157.
- [87.](#) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers (1962), 107; SZ 76.
- [88.](#) *ibid.*, 98; SZ, 69.
- [89.](#) *ibid.*, 99; SZ, 69.
- [90.](#) *ibid.*, 99; SZ, 69.

- [91.](#) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, UK/Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. (1997), 202. For a detailed discussion of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Confucianism on social practice theory, see Kwang Sae Lee, *Social Practice Theory: Variations on Wittgensteinian, Heideggerian, and Confucian Themes*, Paper presented at the Fourth Symposium on Field-Being and the Non-Substantialistic Turn, Fairfield, CT on August 9, 2000. This article will be published in a future issue of the International Journal for Field-Being on social practice.
- [92.](#) A.C Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*, La Salle: Open Court (1989), 258.
- [93.](#) *ibid.*, 11.
- [94.](#) I borrow this phrase from Humbert L. Dreyfus, *Being-In-The-World*, Cambridge, Massachusetts/Cambridge, England: The MIT Press (1997), 18.
- [95.](#) Robert Eno, *The Confucian Creation of Heaven*, Albany: State University of New York (1990), 66.
- [96.](#) Herman Philipse, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1998).
- [97.](#) *ibid.*, 136.
- [98.](#) *ibid.*, 138. Concerning the expression “in itself (An-sich),” Philipse makes reference to an italicized passage in SZ, section 18, 87.
- [99.](#) Philipse also believe that to understand “the conceptual structures in which everyday Dasein expresses itself in everyday life. . . . Rather than Heidegger, we should adopt Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and Strawson as our teachers here.” (Phlipse, Wittgenstein, 386). I find Philipse' assessment and dismissal of Heidegger rather problematical.
- [100.](#) Herman Philipse, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (1998), 133.
- [101.](#) *ibid.*, 132.

- [102.](#) *ibid.*, 138.
- [103.](#) *ibid.*, 135.
- [104.](#) Gregory McCulloch, *The Mind and its World*, London and New York: Routledge (1995), 120.
- [105.](#) *ibid.*, 119-120.
- [106.](#) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, UK/Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. (1997), 109.

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