

“The Crossing of the Ways”: Schopenhauer’s Ethics as a Cultural Bridge

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“Poor Schopenhauer had this secret guilt, too, in his heart, the guilt of cherishing his philosophy more than his fellow men.” So wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in his incisive essay from *Thoughts Out Of Season*, “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874). Nietzsche goes on to say: “He often chose falsely in his desire to find real trust and compassion in men, only to return with a heavy heart to his faithful dog again. He was absolutely alone, with no single friend of his own kind to comfort him . . .”¹

Be that as it may, this friendless and bad-tempered philosopher still has much to teach us about the nature of morality. I will argue that Schopenhauer (1788-1860), whom Nietzsche called the first inexorable atheist among German philosophers, can provide a bridge between the dominant traditions of the Western World: Hinduism, Buddhism, Judeo-Christianity, and atheistic humanism, in their search for common ground.

In his 1989 book *The Silence of God*, Raimundo Panikkar discusses the modern phenomenon of atheism. Many of the roles traditionally performed by God are now achieved by humans, through science and technology. “It is increasingly difficult,” writes Panikkar, a Catholic priest as well as a scholar of Hindu and Buddhist traditions: “to find someone who will turn to God rather than the doctor for healing, or who does not bother to have an emergency water supply in case the seasons fail.”² This is a new type of atheism, unlike the anti-clerical movements of the past, which combated obscurantism and churchly abuses and which strongly influenced Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in their own polemics. “Strictly speaking,” Panikkar writes, “the new atheism rises up neither to combat nor to deny God unequivocally.”³ Rather, more and more people seem to live without a transcendent grounding for their lives. It is perhaps not coincidental that many in the Western secular world are pursuing an interest in Buddhist studies, for, he notes, “Both cultures, the modern, of Western stamp, and the Buddhist, are atheistic.”⁴

In an earlier book, *The Intrareligious Dialogue*, Panikkar claims that “the silence of God” can provide a common ground, or what he calls “The Crossing of the Ways,” for various traditions to meet. He quite rightly cautions us against the tendency to conflate Judeo-Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and atheistic humanism into one amorphous lump—the teachings, practices and even the languages of all these traditions are not amenable to such a shallow interpretation, and “nothing is more harmful than hurried syntheses or superficial parallelisms.”⁵ Rather, he advocates what he calls “the notion of homology,” examining the correlating points of the differing systems. This method does not imply that one system is superior to another nor that the systems are interchangeable. It seeks points of commonality, which can serve to broaden an appreciation of the systems and allow an opportunity for real discussion amongst all participants. One such homologous notion, common to all the traditions, is the subject of love. “By love,” Panikkar writes, “I mean that impulse, that force impelling us to our fellow-beings and leading us

to discover in them what is lacking in us. To be sure, real love does not aim for victory in the encounter. It longs for common recognition of the truth, without blotting out the differences or muting the various melodies in the single polyphonic symphony."⁶ I would like to propose that Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy - in particular his discussion of compassion as the basis of morality—can further this homologous project.

At first glance, Schopenhauer would seem a poor bridge-builder between traditions. He occupies an anomalous position in the history of philosophy. His writings are a peculiar mixture of rigorous analysis of concepts, idiosyncratic interpretations of previous systems, and biting attacks on his enemies. For much of his life he was ignored, and most of the copies of his 1844 masterwork *The World as Will and Representation*, in Nietzsche's words "had to be turned into wastepaper . . ."⁷

The imminent risk that his great work would be undone, merely by neglect, bred in him a state of unrest . . . It is tragic to watch his search for any evidence of recognition, and his piercing cry of triumph at last, that he would now really be read (*legor et legar*), touches us with a thrill of pain. All the traits in which we do not see the great philosopher show us the suffering man, anxious for his noble possessions: he was tortured by the fear of losing his little property, and perhaps of no longer being able to maintain in its purity his truly antique attitude toward philosophy.⁸

Yet, unlike Nietzsche, Schopenhauer did receive recognition before his death. There is a note of childish glee in his reaction to this late-found fame. Blaming his long-standing obscurity on professional academics who had denied him his proper due, he compared himself to Caspar Hauser (1812?-1833), the mysterious young man who was said to have spent his first sixteen years in total isolation, and was perhaps the rightful heir to a royal throne.⁹ In the preface to the 1854 *On the Will in Nature*, published shortly after his own "re-discovery," Schopenhauer crows: "I have to convey a sad piece of news to the professors of philosophy. Their Caspar Hauser . . . whom they so carefully secluded and so securely walled in from light and air for nearly forty years that not a sound could betray his existence to the world - their Caspar Hauser, I say, has escaped! He has escaped and is running around the world; some even imagine he is a prince."¹⁰

It is here that Schopenhauer offers the cry that so pained Nietzsche's delicate ears: "What I mean is that people have begun to read my works and will not again refrain from so doing. *Legor et legar*: and it cannot be altered."¹¹ For the remaining six years of his life, and for decades thereafter, his work was indeed much discussed, not only by professors of philosophy (at least those who did not take offense at being referred to as "the most miserable compilers of compendia"), but also musicians like Richard Wagner and Gustav Mahler, and novelists like Thomas Hardy, Thomas Mann, Joseph Conrad, Leo Tolstoy and Marcel Proust.¹² Yet his influence has waned in recent years, at least in the English-speaking world. There remains something rather *outré* about the man and his writings - neither the analytic nor the continental schools of philosophy have embraced him to their bosoms, a fact he might well have considered all to the good. As one of his foremost contemporary defenders, Richard Taylor asserted: "Academics never have, and I fear never will, understand and appreciate the depth and beauty of Schopenhauer's philosophy."¹³

While his style was certainly *sui generis* (the heavy use of Latin phrases is quite in keeping with his style), Schopenhauer's writings were the meeting ground for several philosophical traditions. He himself gave credit to three main sources of inspiration: Plato, Kant, and the Upanishads. Certainly he was unique in admitting Eastern thought—Hinduism and Buddhism—into his writings at a time when few Western writers took such traditions seriously, or paid them much heed. He read the Upanishads every night before retiring, and makes frequent references to them. In addition, he was well-steeped in English empiricism, being particularly fond of Hume, whose writings on religion he once hoped to translate into German.

In his book *Arthur Schopenhauer's English Schooling*, Patrick Bridgewater ascribes Schopenhauer's blistering attacks on Christianity to the grueling three months he spent at the age of fifteen in a stereotypical English boarding school, run by a man he referred to as a "parson terrorist."¹⁴ Bridgewater's claim that "the intemperate nature of the philosopher's language is readily—and only—explicable in terms of having Dr. (Samuel) Johnson's example rammed down his throat"¹⁵ by Thomas Lancaster, the "parson terrorist," strikes me as implausible and overly reductive. It smacks too much of *Jane Eyre's* Mr. Brocklehurst. Schopenhauer, through his father's influence, had already been steeped in the anti-clerical writings of Voltaire, and he inherited some of the latter's caustic wit. Schopenhauer did not need three months of pedantic schooling in a narrow-minded Christian setting to make him re-echo Voltaire's battle-cry "crush the infamous thing." His hatred of dogmatism, mummery and obscurantism was an ingrained part of his character. Still, Bridgewater ably shows the roots of Schopenhauer's lifelong love for England, in particular the philosophical clarity of Hume. It is not surprising that Schopenhauer's writings are sprinkled with examples he had culled from his daily reading of *The London Times*.

For all of his fire-breathing comments about its clerics and its institutions, Schopenhauer did not despise Christianity per se. As Brian Magee notes, in his book *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*:

Although in no sense whatsoever a religious believer, indeed a declared atheist, he had the profoundest respect for Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity . . . He thought that Christianity, rightly understood, was much closer to Buddhism than is generally recognized. He regarded the history of the Church, and indeed of Christendom, with a good deal of contempt, but this was because the teachings of the founder to whom lip service was paid had been so monstrously perverted or disregarded . . . Schopenhauer regarded Jesus the man as being almost a sort of natural Buddhist . . ."¹⁶

What was it that Schopenhauer felt that Christ and the Buddha had in common? They both preached the virtue of compassion. And it is "compassion" which, Schopenhauer argued, is the foundation for all systems of morality, whatever claims to the contrary they might make.

It might seem strange that a man who demonstrated little fellow-feeling in his own encounters with others should place such a high value on compassion.¹⁷ John Atwell notes in *Schopenhauer: The Human Character* that: "The things he prized most highly—celibacy, compassion, disregard for acclaim—he did not practice."¹⁸ But Schopenhauer was well aware of this seeming contradiction, commenting in *The World as Will and Representation*: "It is just as little necessary

for the saint to be a philosopher as for the philosopher to be a saint; just as it is not necessary for a perfectly beautiful person to be a great sculptor, or for a great sculptor to be himself a beautiful person. In general, it is a strange demand on a moralist that he should commend no other virtue than that which he himself possesses."¹⁹ (This is what is known in the military as a "pre-emptive strike.") David E. Cartwright remarks that:

Schopenhauer's ethical theory is purely descriptive. Rather than prescribing what we ought to do, how we ought to do it, and the moral ideals we should adopt for a good life, his ethics is designed to answer the question, "What moves individuals to perform actions of a particular moral value?" By answering this question he claimed to have uncovered the "foundations of morality."²⁰

As a philosopher, his job was to describe and analyze compassion—there was no compunction to actually practice it. Yet for all of his bombast, there is much that makes Schopenhauer a sympathetic character. There is, for instance, his concern for the suffering of animals. "The greatest benefit conferred by the railways," he writes, "is that they spare millions of draught-horses their miserable existences."²¹ There is as well a personal quality to his writings, which Iris Murdoch perfectly captures in her 1994 book *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*: "In terms of philosophical style, Schopenhauer represents what Wittgenstein shudders from: an insatiable omnivorous muddled cheerful often casual volubility. Schopenhauer's relation to his reader is relaxed, amicable, confiding, that of a kindly teacher or fellow seeker. He tells stories and makes jokes."²²

Schopenhauer's initial discussion of love, especially love between the sexes, is far from romantic. He bluntly states that love is rooted in the sex impulse alone. It is the means by which the blind will is able to perpetuate the human species. Sexual love, or *eros*, is based on deception. He writes:

If the act of procreation were neither the outcome of a desire nor accompanied by feelings of pleasure, but a matter to be decided on the basis of purely rational considerations, is it likely the human race would still exist? Would each of us not rather have felt so much pity for the coming generation as to prefer to spare it the burden of existence, or at least not wish to take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood?²³

In his chapter on "The Metaphysics of Sexual Love" in *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer details how the true end of all love-affairs, though the participants themselves are often unaware of it, is the begetting of children. They seek not their own interest, but rather that of a third person who has not yet come into existence—another instantiation of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer sees something sublime in this overriding of the couple's own interest, although he cannot help chuckling over their plight. "Thus," he writes, "because the passion rested on a delusion that presented as valuable for the individual what is of value only for the species, the deception is bound to vanish after the end of the species has been attained."²⁴

Irving Singer, in the second volume of his three-volume *The Nature of Love*, takes Schopenhauer to task for his reduction of *eros* to merely the means of propagating the species. Singer states that his most glaring defect is his inability, or unwillingness, to recognize the role which non-genetic

factors play in influencing marital and sexual relations among human beings. In particular, he avoids discussing the enjoyment people find in erotic relationships. Singer writes: "one constantly intuits that Schopenhauer himself had no awareness of how people feel when they are actually fulfilling their nature. Enjoyment, consummation, as a constructive and consecutive element in life, he makes little effort to analyze or understand."²⁵

There does seem to be an important element missing in Schopenhauer's description of how couples relate to one another, in particular the joys—and the risks—involved in child-rearing. Given his jaundiced views on the subject, it is probably merciful that Schopenhauer himself never married nor raised a child, although he did father at least one. Apparently, the life-force was too much even for him to completely avoid.

One should not be too quick to dismiss his views on sexual love as outmoded, however. The contemporary geneticist George Klein wrote an essay entitled "Blind Will and Selfish DNA," in which he compares Schopenhauer's writings on the will to contemporary sociobiological studies, especially the work of Richard Dawkins, author of *The Selfish Gene*. Dawkins' exploration of the ways in which our genes compel us to act in ways beneficial for their own survival, without our conscious awareness, is akin to Schopenhauer's views. Klein also points out that, while the tone of Schopenhauer's writings on *eros* is negative in the extreme, it would be wrong to think of him as uncaring:

It is imperative, in Schopenhauer's opinion, to strive to see through the deceptions, to untangle "the web of the Maya." Anyone who succeeds in this will recognize himself in every other individual of the same species. It is only through this identification with others that one can achieve *Mitleid*, compassion, *agape*, *caritas*, *pieta*.²⁶

It is compassion, or fellow-feeling, which Schopenhauer claims is the basis of ethics. Moral behavior consists of an intuitive recognition that we are all manifestations of the will to live. All the great religions, he holds, were attempts to express this metaphysical reality, although they usually botched the job by fomenting doctrinal disputes of their own making:

The conviction that the world, and therefore man too, is something which really ought not to exist is in fact calculated to instill in us indulgence towards one another: for what can be expected of beings placed in such a situation as we are? . . . this . . . reminds us of what are the most necessary of all things: tolerance, patience, forbearance and charity, which each of us needs and which each of us therefore owes.²⁷

Moving words, although somewhat inconsistent from a man who referred to his contemporary Hegel as an impudent scribbler of nonsense and the Caliban of philosophy.

Schopenhauer's most detailed examination of compassion is found in his 1839 essay *On the Basis of Morality*. It has a peculiar history. In that same year, at the age of fifty, he received his first public notice when his *On the Freedom of the Human Will* was awarded the prize for best essay in a contest sponsored by the Norwegian Scientific Society. Flushed with success, he submitted an essay to the Royal Danish Society of Scientific Studies, which had posed the

following question: "Are the source and foundation of morals to be looked for in an idea of morality lying immediately in consciousness (or conscience) and in the analysis of the other fundamental moral concepts springing from that idea, or are they to be looked for in a different ground of knowledge?" Answering in the negative, Schopenhauer propounded the theory that the source and foundation of morals had nothing at all to do with knowledge, but rather in what he called "the great mystery of ethics" - compassion.

Fully expecting to win this second Scandinavian academic contest, Schopenhauer arranged for both essays to be published together in a work entitled *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. He was outraged to discover that the Royal Danish Society did not award him the prize. To add insult to injury, the Society's published rejection made it known that his had been the only entry.

Schopenhauer had his two essays published together, in 1841, but the title page for the second essay proudly read: "On the Basis of Morality: not awarded a prize by the Royal Danish Society of Scientific Studies, at Copenhagen, on 30 January 1840." The introduction consisted of a lengthy diatribe against the Society's failure to understand or appreciate his argument, coupled with a scathing attack on the Society's admiration for Hegel, "the *summus philosophus*, who always had 'the thought' only in his mouth, just as public houses have on their signboards a portrait of the prince who never frequents them."²⁸ David Cartwright adds: "Indeed, Schopenhauer's sense of being wronged was so great that in the preface to the second edition of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1860), he was still spitting fire."²⁹ And this just months before his death. No one could hold a grudge like Schopenhauer could.

On the Basis of Morality asks the question: What can motivate individuals to overcome their egoistic tendencies? Surely not adherence to theistic commandments or the categorical imperative. As Christopher Janaway points out, Kant's "You Ought" is for Schopenhauer "a theological notion in disguise. The language in which Kant speaks here has biblical overtones, and, to the atheist Schopenhauer, the very idea of an absolute command either trades surreptitiously on the assumption of an absolute being who may issue it, or it unfounded."³⁰ Morality does not originate in human rationality, which is merely instrumental, concerned with the means towards some end which one already has in mind. For Schopenhauer, all moral actions can be expressed by the Latin phrase *Neminem Laede, imo omnes quantum potes, juva* ("Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can"). Empirical investigation shows that there are only three fundamental incentives which motivate human actions:

- a) Egoism: the desire for one's own well-being.
- b) Malice: the desire for another's woe.
- c) Compassion: the desire for another's well-being.

"Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice, and compassion," according to Schopenhauer, "are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue."³¹

One can see the Platonic influence in this threefold categorization. It is interesting that he does not discuss a fourth possibility, malice toward one's own self—the topic of suicide was one that he was particularly sensitive about.³² Schopenhauer held that people will be stirred to actions by the motives to which they are primarily susceptible. For instance, should you wish to induce an egoist to perform an act of loving-kindness, you must dupe him into believing the act will somehow benefit himself. But unlike the egoist, who tends to make a great distinction between himself and all other humans - and indeed all other living things—and who lives by the maxim *pereat mundus, dum ego salvus sim* ("may the world perish, provided I am safe"), a man of compassionate character makes no such sharp distinction. Instead, he sees himself as fundamentally a part of and involved with the suffering world.

For the egoist, Schopenhauer says, humanity is the non-ego, but to the compassionate man, it is "myself, once more."

Every purely beneficent act, every instance of wholly and truly disinterested help, which as such has another's distress as its motive, is, if we probe the matter to the bottom, really a mysterious action. It is practical mysticism insofar as it ultimately springs from the same knowledge that constitutes the essence of all mysticism proper. In no other way can it be truly explained. That a man gives alms without having, even remotely, any other object than that of lessening the want that oppresses another, is possible only insofar as he recognizes that it is his own self which now appears before him in that doleful and dejected form, and hence that he recognizes against his own inner being-in-itself in the phenomenal appearance of another.³³

It is no wonder, then, that Schopenhauer calls compassion "the great mystery" of ethics, nor is it puzzling that he was intrigued by the examples and the discussions of this found within the Christian, Hindu and Buddhist traditions. In his view, the only means of explaining ethics is through metaphysics, and he adds:

On account of this undeniable ethical metaphysical tendency of life, no religion in the world could gain a footing without an explanation of life on these lines. For by means of its ethical side, every religion has its fixed points in our minds. It makes its dogma the basis of the moral incentive which everyone can feel, but for that reason does not yet understand, so closely connecting dogma and moral incentive that the two appear to be inseparable. Indeed, priests try to proclaim that unbelief and immorality are one and the same thing. This is the reason why the believer considers the unbeliever to be identical with the morally bad, as seen in the fact that expressions such as godless, atheistic, unchristian, heretic, and the like, are used as synonyms for moral depravity.³⁴

In his first book, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (which was an outgrowth of his dissertation), Schopenhauer also makes the point that it is a mistake to relate religion to theism as the genus to a single species. As Panikkar notes, Schopenhauer considered Buddhism to be unambiguously atheistic,³⁵ and included Taoism and Confucianism as equally atheistic worldviews. "Incidentally," Schopenhauer writes, "it should be observed that the word 'atheism' contains a surreptitious assumption, in that it assumes in advance that theism is self-evident."³⁶

We see here a meeting place for dialogue. In *The Silence of God*, Panikkar provides a rich description of various types of atheism and their connection with Buddhism. Like Schopenhauer, he points out that what has been called "atheism" is not, or need not be, a reaction against a series of propositions proving the existence of a Supreme Being: "It is not a kind of corrective for theism."³⁷ Instead, it represents a new stage in the development of humanity.

Schopenhauer's life and writings perhaps mark the turning-point in this development in the Western World. In his preface to *On the Will in Nature*, he discusses what he calls "the steady growth of unbelief," which goes hand-in-hand with the expanding empirical and historical knowledge science has provided (a notion Nietzsche would return to with his famous statement "God is dead and we have killed Him"). But Schopenhauer, in discussing the clash between atheists and theists, places a curse on both their houses. The former, obsessed with accumulating new information and unconcerned about the past, "calmly throwing out of the window the intellectual labor of two thousand years," are mere scoffers of religion. "Either catechism or materialism" is their battle cry. They reject not only the form, but the spirit and sense of Christianity. The theists, though, fan the flames of this growing unbelief by their adherence to Tartuffian hypocrisy, and their preoccupation with gratuities and churchly privileges.

In *The Fourfold Root*, Schopenhauer adds that the Church is tottering. "The number of those rendered unfit for belief by a certain degree and extent of knowledge has become considerable. This is testified by the general dissemination of that shallow rationalism which is showing ever more openly its bulldog face."³⁸ How does one escape from this impasse, with dogmatic belief on one side and shallow materialism on the other? Perhaps not surprisingly, Schopenhauer presents himself as the means of escape. Like the cavalry coming to the rescue, he declares: "There is a boiling-point on the scale of culture where all faith, revelation, and authorities evaporate; where man desires to judge for himself, and wishes to be not only instructed but also convinced . . . Hollow verbiage and the impotent efforts of intellectual eunuchs then no longer suffice. On the contrary, there is need for a philosophy seriously meant, in other words, one that is directed to truth and not to salaries and fees. Such a philosophy, therefore, does not ask whether it has to please ministers or councillors, or serve this or that religious cause for the time being."³⁹ In other words, read *The World as Will and Representation* and all its corollaries.

For all his bombast, there is much wisdom in this advice—perhaps more so for our own time than when it was written. Schopenhauer deserves credit for appreciating the insights of Eastern thought. He recognized that the philosophy of his own day was rapidly becoming desiccated and self-referential, with little to say about the issues most pertinent to people's lives. At the same time, the age-old religious structures were tottering from the accumulated blows of scientific, cultural and historical re-evaluations. Schopenhauer was one of the first philosophers to propose a true dialogue between traditions, and his own manner of living demonstrated this cosmopolitanism. His study contained a gilt-bronze Buddha on a marble stand, a bust of Kant, an oil portrait of Goethe, and—attesting to his love of animals—sixteen portraits of canines.⁴⁰ Schopenhauer also owned a succession of poodles, naming his favorite "Atma" and commenting upon its remarkable intelligence.⁴¹

Much work still needs to be done on the role that compassion plays in human morality.⁴² A study of Schopenhauer's work, examined from the standpoint of the various traditions he critiqued, would be a fruitful endeavor. As Richard Taylor puts it:

Schopenhauer . . . consistently and unabashedly included all living things within the scope of his ethics, thereby setting his thought quite apart, not only from the Christian tradition, but from virtually all of the ethical philosophies of the western tradition. Schopenhauerian ethics, though profound, moving and unique, has never won widespread adherence among philosophers, largely because of the obstacle posed by Kantian ethics. This, with its emphasis on reason and law, bewitches thinkers whose whole acculturation has instilled in them a veritable reverence for both. The reverence for reason, so clearly exhibited in Kantian ethics, is the legacy of our philosophical tradition, derived from ancient Greece, and the value placed upon law and commands is the heritage of the whole Judeo-Christian tradition. Anyone able to see beyond these traditions, however, can hardly fail to be moved by the beauty and sensitivity of this part of Schopenhauer's philosophy.⁴³

Yet the very fact that no tradition - not even the atheistic humanist one - has ever embraced Schopenhauer completely, ironically, makes it more palatable to see him as a bridge across the divide. Our task, then, is to consider in further detail Schopenhauer's examination of compassion. It will be may be made easier by what I perceive as a renaissance in interest in Schopenhauer in the English-speaking world.⁴⁴ Perhaps Caspar Hauser has escaped again.

NOTES

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, ed. Geoffrey Clive (New York: Signet Classics, 1965), p. 338. This description—aside from the dog—is more appropriate to Nietzsche himself than to Schopenhauer.

2. Raimundo Panikkar, *The Silence of God* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989), p. 95.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1012.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Raimundo Panikkar, *The Intrareligious Dialogue* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p.31.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

7. Nietzsche, *ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. Werner Herzog's 1976 film biography of Hauser has an appropriately Schopenhauerian title: *Every Man for Himself and God Against All*. See Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson's *Lost Prince: The Unsolved Mystery of Kaspar Hauser* (New York: The Free Press, 1996) for further details on this strange case.

10. Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Will in Nature*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1992), p.5.

11. *Ibid.*

12. In his book *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), Brian Magee devotes two chapters to discussing Schopenhauer's influence on several noted creative artists.

13. Personal communication.

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14. He had been placed there by his mother, in the middle of a European tour the family was taking. Finding Arthur to be an impediment to her own enjoyment of the tour, she decided to leave him in England while she and her husband continued their excursions. No doubt this had an effect on the future complete break between mother and son.
 15. Patrick Bridgewater, *Arthur Schopenhauer's English Schooling* (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 358.
 16. Bryan Magee, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp.320-321.
 17. For instance, he was sued by his landlady, who claimed he deliberately pushed her down a flight of stairs, and his relationship with his family members gave new meaning to the term "strained."
 18. John E. Atwell, *Schopenhauer: The Human Character* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p.255.
 19. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 383.
 20. David E. Cartwright, "Schopenhauer's Compassion and Nietzsche's Ethics", *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch*, 69. Band, 1988, p.560.
 21. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Essays and Aphorisms*, trans. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 171.
 22. Iris Murdoch, *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* (New York: The Penguin Press, 1992), p. 79.
 23. Schopenhauer, *Essays and Aphorisms*, pp. 47-48.
 24. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. II, p.557.
 25. Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love*, Volume II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 460.
 26. George Klein, *Pieta*, trans. Theodore and Ingrid Friedmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), p.15.
 27. Schopenhauer, *Essays and Aphorisms*, p. 50.
 28. Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), p.18. His animosity toward Hegel was longstanding. As an instructor at the University of Berlin, he deliberately scheduled his own lectures at the same time as Hegel's, only to give up teaching in disgust when no students came to hear him.
 29. Ibid.
 30. Christopher Janaway, *Schopenhauer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 74.
 31. Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, p. 192.
 32. It was rumored that his father had ended his own life, which Schopenhauer always vehemently denied.
 33. Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, pp. 201-202.
 34. Ibid., p.212.
 35. Panikkar, *The Silence of God*, p. 179.
 36. Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1992), p. 188.
 37. Panikkar, *The Silence of God*, pp. 96-97.
 38. Schopenhauer, *On the Fourfold Root*, p. 179.
 39. Ibid., p. 180.
 40. Bridgewater, p. 347.
 41. In his book *The Intelligence of Dogs* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), Stanley Coren ranks the poodle second only to the border collie in Obedience and Working Intelligence, adding that he has heard numerous anecdotes about poodles "driving their owners crazy because they learned so rapidly and solved problems so efficiently. Dogs like this learn to open doors by using their mouths on door knobs, may

figure out how to get into floor-level cabinets for biscuits or other goodies, or may act in bizarre ways to get attention. Because they are so intelligent, they think their way into a number of problems." Pp. 233-234.

42. A recent work on this topic is Candace Clark's *Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), which unfortunately does not mention Schopenhauer.

43. Richard Taylor, "Arthur Schopenhauer", *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, Volume I, eds. Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz and Patrick Sherry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 175.

44. In recent years, new editions of *On the Will in Nature* (1992), The Germany Library edition *Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosophical Writings* (1994), *The World as Will and Idea* (1995), *On the Basis of Morality* (1995), and *The Wisdom of Life and Counsels and Maxims*, have been published, as well as such examinations of his work as Rüdiger Safranski's *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy* (1990), Christopher Janaway's Past Masters Series volume on *Schopenhauer* (1994), and John E. Atwell's two studies, *Schopenhauer: The Human Character* (1990) and *Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will* (1995).