

On Marx's Concept of Being-in-the-world

Hui Dong

Being-in-the-world from Marx's Perspective

Being-in-the-world has always been considered as a Heideggerian term. However, in this essay, my intention is not to present a phenomenological analysis, but rather to unfold a totally different ontological meaning from a Marxist view. For, as Kevin Brien has said, being-in-the-world “is a much broader conception than Heidegger’s phenomenological conception;” the reason is that “it is also concerned with getting at the essential structures of reality on the basis of which the phenomena come to be the phenomena.”¹

If being-in-the-world presents a basic ontological structure of Marx’s humanistic and dialectic theory on human nature and human reality, then how can we properly understand that being-in-the-world is the basic ontological structure of human existence?

Firstly, we should start from the point that being-in-the-world indicates an interconnection between human and nature, human self and others, or the point that the human being stands in relationship to the natural world and to other people in the natural world. Such a starting point also suggests a transformation between nature and human beings.

The internal relationship and intrinsic interconnection here not only constitute a dimension of Marx’s being-in-the-world but provide a basic and stable ground for human existence, human being defined here as those whom we consider to be full of infinite variability, mutability and diversity. As Marx has said, “Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, in so far it is not itself the human body. To say man lives on nature means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.”² The internal relationship between nature and human is affirmed here. The natural world is a premise for the human being, for without the natural world there would be no human existence. Thus, human beings can be realized only in the internal connection and dynamic interconnection with the natural world. They are not merely in the world. So, there is an essential and internal interrelationship between the human being and the natural world. Human beings are natural beings. On the one hand, they exist within a wider natural world which is by and large independent of humankind, and which definitely becomes the premise of their existence. On the other hand, they represent their subjectivity through conscious activity length by length, level by level, by entering the natural world. Human beings change themselves and the natural world through activity; this kind of transformation takes place in the practical world. Such is the objection to Hegel, who mystifies the real situation and the relation between human beings and the natural world. This is so because he thinks that everything takes place merely in thoughts, history being the development of our thoughts.

Marx claims that, “To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself...is one and the same thing.”³ Marx also asserts that man’s action is the subjectivity of objective essential powers, and at the same time, must also be something objective.⁴ Nature provides humans with the means of life, so humans can create nothing without nature, that is, the sensuous, external world. Human beings shape and reshape the natural world while shaping and reshaping themselves. Hence, human beings and nature exist in a dialectical relationship. For Marx, it is absolutely necessary for human beings to objectify themselves in the natural world, to externalize themselves in the interconnection with other people in the natural world.

Secondly, being-in-the-world illuminates a process of human development and can be regarded as the highest stage of human development in which the real free, creative human is truly fulfilled.

Strictly speaking, Marx considers that, although man is the maker of himself, he has not yet made himself with full practical consciousness of himself as a social individual. Engels also discourses upon man’s failure thus far to make history consciously, as well as his capacity to make it consciously in the future. What does this mean? As I have pointed out, human beings make themselves through this very process, that is, human beings objectify themselves by acting in and upon the natural world, with the interconnection with others, to others. The history of humanity is the history of man’s full creation, morality, and productive capacities, i.e. the history of man’s self-creation, self-fulfillment, and self-realization. A human being has the potential to be actualized as a self-conscious, reflective, creative and willed activity. In this process, men own life as an object for themselves, a process which is different from other animals. There is a difference between the potential of the human being and the human beings’ fulfillment. However, men’s capacity to be self-conscious, to be a real human being, and to truly exist as being-in-the-world is inevitable, for it can be accomplished through man’s own activity, through both their sensuous and practical activity. Owing to this capacity, men can decide to change their life style, their social role, and their relationship toward other human beings. This capacity can also make human beings go beyond or transcend themselves, in the way they have made themselves in the past, as well as in the possibility of new ways.

Being-in-the-world indicates a history of human development, a process from man’s “potential being” to his “actual being,” and an evolution from just “being” to “being-in-the-world.” Men have the ability to develop a clear critical consciousness about themselves. In order to be truly realized, human beings have no choice but to try to make their potential realized, especially through their social activity, which is the particular way in which individuals are related to the world in terms of their activities. It is very clear that men’s being-in-the-world is different at different stages in their development, and that human nature changes throughout history. The highest stage can be regarded as being-in-the-world, which seems somewhat perfect and ideal, with immanent request for human beings’ freedom. The essence of men is their characteristic “being-in-the-world,” which is extracted from their concrete and practical conscious activity in the

world that is full of dynamic interactions and as well as constellations of ideas, desires and needs.

Human beings are never satisfied with what they have gained and what the circumstances have made them to be. Instead, they have the capacity to go beyond or transcend all these by their own activities, which indicates the possibility and whole process of pursuing freedom. Men, themselves are a process, that is, they are always in the process of making themselves, inasmuch as they are never fully made; and they have the inherent potential and capacity that exceed expectations to transcend themselves. Man is free, because he can go out of “himself” or “what he has been made before,” through “breaking through” the traditional ways of making himself, and try to actualize him self by actualizing the possibility of what s/he depends on and decides upon. Therefore, man’s freedom, which is the attainment of man’s self-realization, self-fulfillment, and self-actualization, can be regarded as his uppermost mode of being-in-the-world.

In addition, being-in-the-world means “becoming” rather than “being.” From Marx’s view, it can be comprehended as a systematic project of art or the aesthetic experience of human.

The final issue related to humanity is the aesthetic. While achieving the essence of being is the ultimate intention of human praxis, the claim is that humanity can never stick on the sensible surface of an individual’s existence, but should practice into the deep life which can discern and reveal the significant living. The free and self-conscious nature of a human’s life activity can be finally performed and realized in the field of aesthetics. As the subjectivity of praxis, human beings realize their nature of being through aesthetic activities, through which their meaningful life can be present and open wide freely. Aesthetics can be regarded as the meta-physical dimension of human nature. As a natural being, man must obey nature and rule of nature; while as a free being, man is supposed to have the creative will and aesthetic orientation to transcend the practical activities. With man’s particular experience of life and characteristic and reflective consciousness, man reveals the creative nature of praxis, the rule of aesthetics contained in praxis, thus trying to fix himself as truly being-in-the-world.

It is familiar to us that Marx also has a strong commitment to human artistic expression. He always expresses the creative power of human beings in a world of art and literature. Art, for Marx, is “a token of [the] human capacity for free creation and enjoyment which gives grounds for high hopes for man’s future.”⁵ Marx conveys that the development of human power and process of human capacity can be regarded as an artistic expression, through which human beings can establish a realm of human freedom. By implication, the society, like a big arena, gives human beings, who go by the name of actors or artists, sufficient space to express and create themselves and the nature of society in terms of the interrelationship with nature and other people fully and freely. Human beings recognize themselves as real being-in-the-world seeking association and common freedom with others and realizing their creative power in concrete and practical activity.

The process of becoming an aesthetic man is the creation of an aesthetic man, but as well the realization of culture, the development of social creativity, and the very essence of a human’s being-in-the-world. The ontology of social existence and practical activity lead to Marx’s systematic aesthetics on the basis of his dialectical and historical materialism. Lukacs once

speculated that “the genuinely Marxist ontology of existence in society points directly to the necessity of erecting a systematic aesthetic on the foundations of dialectical materialism”⁶ and that it points to aesthetic man, for he considers aesthetic as being the solution to the question of the meaning of man’s existence in society.

Further Analysis

In light of the above passage, we have sketched out Marx’s view of “being-in-the-world,” which is often associated with his analysis of human nature, human reality, and human development. However, it is necessary for us to further explore several crucial terms in Marx. Our further analysis serves to give a clear picture of what Marx does mean by “being-in-the-world.”

I will proceed as follows: First, I will consider the problem of the meaning of alienation; then I will examine the practical approach to being in the world; and finally I will show how freedom can be regarded as the highest mode of being-in-the-world, and how it relates to the alienation and praxis.

1. Alienation – a Threat to Being-in-the-world

The theory of alienation was outlined by Marx in his early works published in German-French Yearbooks, and it was extensively developed and became the major concern and prominent theme in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Although the word “alienation” seldom appeared and was rejected by Marx himself later, we still need to put emphasis on it, for it is an objective fact about human lives, and it figures the man’s distorted living mode and incompatibility with the actual life, with human essence becoming “detached” from human existence, which is against the human being-in-the-world.

Marx thinks that the capitalist society is not properly fit for humans, for it crushes the human spirit, denying people any chance to develop their real potential. For Marx, man under capitalism is being alienated from his essence. We can understand this from Marx’s well-known manuscript, Alienation Labor, where he articulates four aspects or characteristics of alienation under capitalism: alienation from the product; alienation in productive activity; alienation from our species-essence; and alienation from other people.⁷ Man at the same time alienates something from himself and himself from something, and he alienates himself from himself. Being forced, his work is not a free self-activity. He is at home if he does not work, and if he works he is not at home. His work and life seem meaningless, which may be interpreted as “an inability to perceive a coherent pattern of cause-effect relationship in the environment. This deprives the individual of minimum standards of clarity in decision making so that it becomes difficult for him to organize his behavior intelligently.”⁸ Man feels himself to be acting freely only when he acts as an animal. Alienation deprives him of a true human existence, divides him from his fellows, and sets worker against employer, poor against rich. Man is a man who really is not a man, and who alienates himself from his generic essence, from his humanity. Then what is the essence of man? We can understand this point in this way: The whole character of a species, or the species’ character, is contained in the

character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species character.⁹ In creating a world of objects by practical activity, in work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species being.¹⁰ This is what Marx regards as the essence of man, or his conscious and practical social activity. To Marx, the essence of man can only be realized in his free conscious activity, which would be "constitutive of a particular mode of being-in-the-world- although not a presently existing one."¹¹ I think the profound spirit of Marx's conception of human essence is the possibilities of human creation and possibilities for human freedom. If the human being, in the past as well as in the present, has been and is still alienated from his essence, it must mean that man alienates himself from the realization of his created possibilities, and the particular modes of being in the world, which characterize human existence, are not the modes of being in the world in which man can permanently create new and higher possibility, that is, man's characteristic human possibility with his free and practical conscious activity.

Alienation is a social phenomenon, as Marx puts, "In fact, the proposition that man's species nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's essential nature. The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man stands to himself, is first realized and expressed in the relationship in which a man stands to other man."¹² It can be understood in terms of the interconnections between human beings. The nature of social relationship is considered in the mode of alienation, where natural necessity, need and private interest become the only bond among them. Men treats others as exclusive means to satisfy their private needs, and other people are used as tools to attain their own ends, thus all human activities are directed by personal interest and private needs. In the sense of social relationship, there is no real relationship.

Alienation is essentially a multidimensional rather than a uni-dimensional phenomenon, something Robert Blauner characterizes as "a general syndrome made up of a number of objective conditions and subjective feeling states" that results from the interaction of the individual with his socio-technical environment.¹³ Blauner's "alienation" becomes more flexible and broader than its original meaning in Marx. Not merely within the framework of capitalism, it is a genuine portrayal which reflects human extreme feeling of dislocation, anxiety, disorientation.

We can arrive now at the heart of the argument that alienation not only is incompatible with the human being-in-the-world, but is a threat to being-in-the-world. As we have pointed out, being-in-the-world indicates an interconnection or relationship between nature and human, subjectivity and objectivity, self and others. Actually, if we explore further, we can find that this kind of relationship implies a whole, harmony or compatibility of humanity and nature, man and his product, his mind and sense, as well as the internal connection with human process of life, with self-realization, with the enjoyment of life and freedom. However, the prominent characteristic of alienation is split, which alienates a man from himself, and his essence from his factual existence. Alienation makes a deeper division in a man's life, and at the same time, nature becomes divided. The cleavage that makes a split of man's significant inward process of life, an outside split off from the inside, detached from the inner life, is definitely a vital vitiating to the human being-in-the-world.

2. Praxis – an Approach to Being-in-the-world

Up to now, we have dealt with Marx's concept of alienation, which alienates human essence from factual existence, and humans from their possibilities of creation, thus presenting a treat to the human being-in-the-world. It is absolutely dangerous, since humans can be alienated even without realizing it. Marx not only raises questions bearing on the human being-in-the-world but also provides some solutions for humans to realize their being-in-the-world, which we also have to deal with in the following. The significance of Marx's achievement is his contemplation on Praxis, which gives a picture of the aliveness of his philosophical theory; moreover, it supports a valuable approach to the human being-in-the-world.

The idea of praxis as a free human activity with definite esthetic qualities, in which man objectifies all his potential powers, affirms himself as a conscious being, and satisfies the needs of other people, is a key concept in Marx's theory, and by all means a value concept, although Marx never gave an exhaustive definition of this notion. Marx establishes his characteristic practical philosophy with a humanist perspective which far transcends the limits of Feuerbach and Hegel on the foundation of praxis. Praxis, as a "criterion" for pursuing truth, as well as alienation and freedom, is a major theme in Marx's philosophical theory. We can only develop our conception of human nature based upon an in-depth understanding of praxis, which is a fundamental standard of Marx's anthropology, philosophy, and social criticism.

Praxis signifies the unity between human beings and nature, human beings and other human beings, a human and society. For Marx, the unity implies a bidirectional course between them, and the unity can only become real through praxis. Praxis establishes a firm foundation for the sensuous world people living in. It is a basis of unity and division of human and nature, as well as the unity and division of human and society. Humanity expresses itself and meaning of history through practical activity, transcends perplexity of human existence and changes the world as well. To Marx, all hitherto existing materialism considers "the thing, reality, sensuousness in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively,"¹⁴ while idealism develops the active side only abstractly, for "idealism doesn't know real, sensuous activity as such."¹⁵ Nature is exactly not a beyond for the reality of human beings, but only a necessary premise or a prior for human existence, and man cannot be apart from nature, while man is product of nature or circumstances in a sense. Full humanity is both free and creative. Human production stands in a special relation to nature. This special and distinctive relation characterizes a man's species life. Moreover, it is humans who change nature, educate and express themselves through conscious social activity. "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice."¹⁶ The human is different from nonhuman animals in so far as animals produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature. The difference lies in the praxis. Human beings themselves are the creator of an open historical process, and set for themselves the task of discovering and changing the natural world, as well as surpassing social limitations in every historical epoch through their own practical activity. Their creation for the natural world is at the same time the self-creation of their own nature, overcoming the alienation, abolishing the tensions

and conflicts, and producing new power, new sense, new needs, and new relationships with others. Man's relation to nature is broader and unlimited, universal. Man is also creating the social structures interweaving with social interrelationships, and this "most natural immediate and necessary relationship" not only shows that to what extent man "is in his individual existence at the same time a social being"¹⁷ but also leads him to reach the real level of being-in-the-world. Through praxis of creating social structures, men think and feel all the essential characteristics of the generic human being, and affirm their own existence.

Praxis focuses on the action of the human being as subject, which shows the process of objectification of a human being's specific potential capacities and powers. In the process of praxis, men affirm their experience as well as personality as a subject, through the approach of changing those features that do not satisfy themselves. Moreover, men make the cosmos-ontological world become their concrete living world, by bringing it into the human value world, thus completing the transformation from "Celestial world" to "Sub lunar/mundane world" on the foundation of praxis. The characteristic of praxis is that it is either merely a physical energy or the ability to perform continuously physical operation, or only an end itself, but the process of self-realization, self-affirmation or fulfillment of personality. Human beings can be aware that, in the process of praxis, and through their creative activity and products, they can not only satisfy their own needs, enrich their own lives and express their own existence value, but also enrich the lives of others and indirectly become a part of them. By participating in the practical activity, men develop an important historical dimension of their individual social being and acquire an ample opportunity to unfold their potential capacities gradually and possibly to affirm themselves as wise, strong and creative personalities. It is a human being's very reified objectification that creates his/her social characteristic and free conscious. Therefore, praxis confirms the transcendental and critical dimension of the human being as the fullest and historically the most developed expression of human.

Praxis has characteristics of a dynamic totality which underlies all the individual characters. It is constituted by human practical activity that is dynamically open. It carries the meaning of human totality, integrality and comprehensive, continuous development. Man is not an isolated individual, and s/he cannot survive indefinitely by her/himself, for s/he has inseparable interconnection with others in society, for as Marx and Engels assert, "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations."¹⁸ Human beings are not strangers in their world insofar as they are able to change their own nature and create new relationships with others in the world. Human beings can act within a given social system interweaving with complicated relationships, while at the same time beyond the limits of the system as a whole, since human nature has a definite structure that is open for further change towards the real being-in-the-world. All practical and conscious striving of human beings to change, to create their world, and to realize their personality is to prove their being-in-the-world in the context of social relationship and totality, since the "human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life—the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity, as need"¹⁹ and as well, "the individual is the social being.....Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual, is just as much the totality."²⁰

Praxis which involves joy and pleasure of everyday free conscious activity in the world is the approach to being-in-the-world, in so far as it springs from a human being's own internally felt needs, realizing a totality of human manifestations of life, and getting a pleasure and enjoyment of life.

3. Freedom – a Highest Mode of Being-in-the-world

Marx discusses human freedom his whole life. It is clear that his concept of freedom has a bearing on human existence and human reality, and it serves as a methodologically viable matrix for carrying out his notion of human emancipation and ideal communism. Full human existence, existence as a social and moral being, or real being-in-the-world, depends on participation in or identification with various concrete social relationships. It is through participation in or identification with these concrete social relationships that individuals go beyond their own natural existence toward the social existence and the universality as well that are required for full human existence. Marx's remarks on freedom, for instance, that freedom can be realized only in communism, for the ultimate goal of communism is "a full freedom of development for each individual," and "all emancipation is restoration of the human world and the relationships of men among themselves,"²¹ can help us reach a better understanding of freedom as a highest mode of being-in-the-world. Marx's two dimensions of freedom are the ontological and the transcendent.

Genuine freedom is connected with actualization of the capacity of self-identification, self-consciousness, and self-realization. It is an historical epoch of human emancipation from alienated labor. Moreover, freedom is the desirable highest mode of being-in-the-world which is contrasted sharply with the alienated mode of being. One is free in the sense that one pursues objects for his self-realization. The individual who is a real being-in-the-world is a freedom-seeker, and at the same time a freedom-accomplisher. In the mode of alienation, in which any rational man is treated only as means and not as an end, feels crushed, and his/her capacities un- fulfilled, for there is no room for freedom. The process of conquering alienation is at the same time a process of pursuing freedom. If human beings conquer alienation, they will be in an un-alienated state which secures them opportunities for their exercise, a mode which enables them to utilize the most of their capacity. People in an un-alienated mode are consciously active in the way that they can continuously bridge the separation between themselves, other people, and their own activities. It is concrete social relationships that provide the arena for the fulfillment of human possibility through the exercise of human capacity. An alienated mode suggests the predominance of alienated modes of being as intimately tied up with the domination of human life by productive apparatus. To overcome alienation means man must overcome the domination that productive apparatus has over them. "Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature."²² Freedom here in Marx's sense is the ability of self-determination and rational control over blind forces of nature and history. Freedom never means for Marx only choice among several possibilities, or the right to do and perform anything that does not harm others. The freedom which rests on an individual capacity to do what he chooses and what he wants is not genuine freedom, but the tyranny over others. In fact,

“Freedom consists in the recognition of necessity.” Necessity must be interpreted dialectically. It is not absolute necessity, but conditional necessity, which leaves room for contingency and “has a reference to those broad ontological structures in the concrete-real that can be comprehended in terms of articulated laws projected at a given level of abstraction.”²³ Freedom as the recognition of necessity is at the same time the recognition of contingency, that is, of the place of contingent events in the generation of the ontological structures that are obtained in the concrete-real, and thus, also the theoretical and practical recognition of the real possibilities for the development of human mastery over the productive apparatus. In this sense, necessity provides an ontological basis for freedom.

When we prefer freedom as one of man’s features, when we classify this characteristics as true man or genuine man, we arrive at an aesthetical notion of man, indicating that freedom is the highest mode of human being-in-the-world, whose nature can be expressed by aesthetic statements from transcendental freedom. The aesthetic notion of man can be supported by that man’s realization in the future is compatible not only with his/her interests and needs, but also with general social or mankind’s interests and needs. Man is not an abstract individual who is separated from the society, but actual individuals striving for a fantastic idea, for freedom as such, “for the freedom of Man appeared instead of the satisfaction of actual needs.”²⁴ Freedom here is not merely the satisfaction of the actual needs, but has transcendent significance. Man lives in the world full of interconnection with others and the whole society. Freedom provides man with pleasurable satisfaction of the sensuous aspects of human nature, which cannot be realized in an alienated mode, for workers in alienated work deny themselves, feel unhappy, and think their labor is coerced. Therefore, there is no genuine freedom within the framework of alienated mode. Marx’s horizon of freedom is rooted in concrete social relations that are independent of human will in the sense that people are born into given, already existing, historically developed social relations which they cannot choose, but which shape the development of individual consciousness from birth. As Brien has remarked, “Human beings are always more than antecedent conditions may have made them be, by virtue of their capacity to make what they become by their own activity.”²⁵ From an individual, sensuous, immediate existence to a social being, or being-in-the-world, human beings use their capacity either to remake themselves in the same way in which they have done in the past, or to go beyond by adopting new ways of actively making themselves. For praxis is also free for human self-fulfillment. Freedom bridges the dichotomy between rationality and sensuousness in which the aesthetic dimension of human experience would become an essential concern to human in his daily life, so that “reason is sensuous and sensuousness rational.”²⁶ As Marcuse speculates, the aesthetic dimension is the realm which “preserves the truth of the senses and reconciles, in the reality of freedom, the lower and the higher faculties of man, sensuousness and intellect, pleasure and reason.”²⁷ Marx has almost the same remarks in Economic Manuscripts:

“.....The transcendence of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, human.....in a word, human sense-the human nature of the senses-comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue if humanized nature.Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility

(a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form-in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being.....”²⁸

We can arrive at the formulation of freedom to be the highest mode of being-in-the-world. To say that freedom is the highest mode of being-in-the-world is to say, first, freedom is based on the full practical development of human activity and vice versa. Freedom is the ideal mode that can be only attained through concrete social relationships obtained among the development of individuals. Freedom recognizes an internal ontological bond among human beings, which goes hand in hand with the development of independent individuals, with other individuals, and even with the totality of social relationships. It is also to say that free man whose emancipation has been completed through free conscious praxis is an actual species-being. That an individual is a real free species-being means that the individual has actually become a fully human social individual through interconnections rooted in concrete practice.

Concluding Remarks

I consider that I have completed the main task I set for myself in this paper. Perhaps, we can now arrive at the practical, humanistic, and historical character of Marx’s concept of being-in-the-world. No doubt, some further problems can be raised. Still, I think it is clear that Marx was first to perceive the social essence of the individual existence, for his concept of being-in-the-world is within a certain social structure and rooted in concrete social relationships.

NOTES

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1. Kevin M. Brien, *Marx, Reason, and the Art of Freedom*, second edition (New York: Humanity Books, Amherst), p. 1.
 2. K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. M. Milligan and ed. D. J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 112.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
 5. S. S. Praver, *Karl Marx and World Literature* (New York, 1978), p. 313.
 6. Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness* (London: Merlin Press), 1967, xxvi.
 7. K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. M. Milligan and ed. D. J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 110-115.
 8. Seeman, Melvin, “On the Meaning of Alienation,” *American Soc. Rev.* 24, 1959, p. 7869.
 9. K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. M. Milligan and ed. D. J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 113.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
 11. Kevin M. Brien, *Marx, Reason, and the Art of Freedom*, second edition (New York: Humanity Books, Amherst), p. 9.
 12. K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. M. Milligan and ed. D. J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 114-115.
 13. Blauner. Robert, *Alienation and Freedom* (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 1964), p. 15.
 14. Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach, German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 665.

15. Ibid., p.665
16. Ibid., p.666
17. Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach, German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 303.
18. Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 660.
19. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, pp. 143-44.
20. Ibid., pp.37-38.
21. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *Writings of the Young Marx*, p. 241.
22. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, p. 820.
23. Kevin M. Brien, *Marx, Reason, and the Art of Freedom*, second edition (New York: Humanity Books, Amherst), p. 140.
24. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 550.
25. Kevin M. Brien, *Marx, Reason, and the Art of Freedom*, second edition (New York: Humanity Books, Amherst), p. 45.
26. This is Marcuse's formulation. See *Eros and Civilization*.
27. See Marcuse, "The Aesthetic Dimension," in *Eros and Civilization*.
28. Kevin M. Brien, *Marx, Reason, And the Art of Freedom*, second edition (New York: Humanity Books, Amherst), pp. 139-141.